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Abstract- This paper presents a scheme for the generation of 
strong high entropy keys based on ICMetrics. ICMetrics 
generates the security attributes of the sensor node based on 
measurable hardware and software characteristics of the 
integrated circuit. This work is based on key derivation functions 
to derive cryptographic key pairs from ICMetrics values. The 
proposed ICMetrics based key derivation function makes use of 
ICMetrics basis numbers and authentication tokens from the 
trusted third party to generate high entropy public/private key 
pairs. The proposed approach makes use of key stretching using 
SHA-2 and performs multiple iterations of the proposed key 
derivation function to generate strong high entropy keys of 
sufficient length, so as to prevent exhaustive search attacks. The 
novelty of this work lies in the fact that the entire key generation 
scheme has been designed keeping in mind the construction 
principles of ICMetrics, which does not store keys but computes 
these for every session based on ICMetrics value, therefore use of 
a random value anywhere in the protocol will compromise the 
purpose of ICMetrics. The proposed scheme generates high 
entropy key pairs while concealing the original ICMetrics data, 
such that it is impossible to recover the ICMetrics basis data in 
the system. 
Keywords- ICMetrics(lntegrated Circuit Metrics), Hermite 
Normal Form (HNF), Trusted Third Party(TTP), key stretching, 
key derivation function 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Embedded computing systems play a major part in various 
aspects of life, ranging from their use in single user 
applications to large scale processes [1]. Examples of their use 
in large scale processes could be sensor nodes aggregating 
sensed data and transmitting it to a centralized server or 
simply their use in handheld devices for a range of single user 
applications. The widespread deployment of high 
speedlbandwidth wireless networks has emerged many 
embedded system applications as well as ported many existing 
applications to embedded systems. However with the increase 
in data communications using these embedded systems, the 
requirement for applications security has become a major 
concern [2]. 
The security of all sensitive applications mainly depends 
on the proper generation and protection of its cryptographic 
keys, since the underlying encryption/decryption algorithms 
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are published and globally known. Therefore there are 
inherent risks if proper keying materials and key management 
is not used for secure operations; this can result in 
compromise of encryption keys that will seriously affect the 
integrity, confidentiality, and availability of communications. 
Without proper generation and handling of keys, keys could 
be easily guessed, modified, or substituted by unauthorized 
personnel who could then intercept sensitive communications. 
Embedded systems have limitations in terms of power, 
memory and processing speed [3]; therefore care needs to be 
taken to choose cryptographic mechanisms for key generation, 
and to determine key sizes according to individual 
applications [4]. Cryptographic algorithms that are used to 
provide secure communication in embedded system 
applications depend on the use of stored encryption/decryption 
keys. These algorithms have the inherent disadvantage that the 
compromise of an embedded system device, can lead to key/ 
secret information being revealed to the adversaries, which 
can ultimately result in even the entire network being 
overtaken and important data being revealed [5]. 
Integrated Circuit Metrics or ICMetrics [8] is an alternative 
to stored encryption/decryption keys that uses unique 
measurable properties and features of a hardware device to 
generate a basis number. TCMetrics is very similar to 
biometrics where human properties and features are used to 
uniquely identity and associate an identity with a person [9]. 
However any number in its raw form cannot serve as a key for 
cryptographic operations; since the extracted keying material 
might be too short or have low entropy, which would make it 
easy to compromise for an attacker. Therefore the generated 
cryptographic keys must possess sufficient key entropy and 
length, before they can qualifY to be kept as a key for secure 
cryptographic operations. 
In this paper we address this issue and propose a key 
generation mechanism for ICMetrics basis number that 
generates high entropy public/private key pair with sufficient 
levels of security. The proposed key generation mechanism 
based on TCMetrics data has the following features that 
address the key management issues in embedded system 
environments: 
1) To safeguard against issues related to key compromise, 
the proposed architecture is based on the use of ICMetrics 
values for key pair generation [10]. ICMetrics generates keys 
based on the hardware/software characteristics and the 
specification of the device which provides an effective means 
to address the issues related to the secrecy of key. Our scheme 
binds a cryptographic key with the device's ICMetrics 
information. 
2) For the purpose of authentication/ identification of the 
device, in our scheme the high entropy key pair is formed by 
combining the ICMetrics generated basis number with a 
partial key generated by the Trusted Third Party (TTP). Both 
of these secret values are combined through a SHA-2 based 
key derivation function [16]. 
3) As stated above, the main challenge with the ICMetrics 
generated basis number is the entropy and length of the 
generated secret value. So our proposed design generates a 
high entropy key of sufficient length using SHA-2 based key 
derivation function. We iterate through multiple rounds of the 
SHA-2 based hash function [24] to stretch the secret value to 
the required length, thereby also generating a key with high 
entropy. 
4) Lastly, our scheme generates a public key 
corresponding to the generated high entropy private key by 
computing the Hermite Normal Form of the private key [6]. 
The Hermite Normal Form is particularly suitable for public 
key generation since its unique, non-reversible and doesn't 
require any random values/ functions for operations [7]. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows; in 
section 2 we discuss characteristics of a strong cryptographic 
key and how weak keys generated by ICMetrics feature values 
pose a threat to security of applications. Section 3 introduces 
the security primitives on which the design of our proposed 
architecture rests. Section 4 explains the network topology for 
our proposed design. The design of our proposed framework 
for the generation of strong high entropy keys is presented in 
section 5. Section 6 presents the analysis of its security. The 
conclusion and future work for our paper is presented in 
section 7. 
11. STRONG CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEYS AND ICMETRICS 
A. Strong Cryptographic Keys 
The security of an application mainly depends on the 
secure generation and usage of cryptographic keys, so that 
they are safeguarded against all sorts of attacks during their 
usage in secure operations. As stated above, the generated 
cryptographic keys must also have certain properties to quality 
as a key to be used for secure operations, since any number in 
its raw form cannot serve as a key for cryptographic 
operations. A longer cryptographic key is more secure, since it 
makes it harder for the adversary to break the encrypted text 
[16][ 19]. Although strong cryptographic functions provide 
data privacy and protection but without secure keys the 
integrity and confidentiality of an application is still at risk. 
A major threat in security applications having weak/ low 
entropy keys is the launch of a brute force/ exhaustive search 
attack [15]. A brute force attack is a very common 
methodology adopted by adversaries to break cryptosystems 
with strong cryptographic operations but weak keys; whereby 
instead of finding weaknesses in the encryption system, the 
attacker tries to crack the cryptographic key used for 
performing the cryptographic operations. From an attacker's 
perspective, longer keys are harder to break compared to 
shorter keys, since the resources required to launch a brute 
force attack grow exponentially with an increase in key size 
[ 19]. 
B. ICMetrics 
Traditionally cryptographic algorithms have always relied 
on the use of stored keys for functioning of the network. 
However the use of stored keys to enable secure 
communication is threatened by the fact that, if the key used to 
encrypt the data is compromised, it will result in loss of data 
that is encrypted using the compromised key. 
ICMetrics (Integrated Circuit metrics) makes use of 
system level characteristics to provide identification to the 
system [12]. It generates encryption key from measurable 
properties of a given hardware device such as hardware/ 
software characteristics and specification of the node; similar 
to the way biometrics extracts human features. 
After each ICMetrics key generation stage the produced 
ICMetric key [13] is temporary and exists only locally, and the 
reproduction of the ICMetric key once again takes place from 
measurable characteristics of the integrated circuit [10]. The 
ICMetric key is generated each time it is requested for 
identification or encryption functions. It consists of measuring 
the system features, applying the normalisation maps and 
combining the various feature values to generate a basis 
number for identifying the system. The individual feature 
values are be combined using two possible feature 
combination techniques; each generating a different sized key 
of varying stability. The feature addition-combination 
technique generates a stable but small basis number by adding 
individual feature values, while the feature concatenation­
combination technique generates a long but less stable basis 
number by concatenating individual feature values. The 
resultant basis number is used for the subsequent derivation of 
the key required for the actual encryption process. 
Modifications to either the software executing on a given 
device, or to its hardware, will cause variations of the feature 
measurable characteristics and therefore the derived basis 
value. This in tum will mean that the system has been 
tampered and will not be able to take part in future operations 
[5]. 
In terms of issues related to key compromise of a device, 
ICMetrics proves to be breakthrough technology, thereby 
generating keys for secure identification of the device. 
However the ICMetrics generated keys can be weak, since they 
maybe short and of low entropy; and could infact pose a severe 
threat to the security of the system. Since a stable ICMetrics 
generated basis number is small in size with low entropy, it 
makes the underlying device open to attacks such as brute force 
and exhaustive search attacks. These attacks can in tum 
completely spoil the security of the application and even lose 
the essence/advantage of ICMetrics. Therefore, our proposed 
scheme intends to resolve the issue of weak keys and generates 
strong keys with high entropy and sufficient length, thereby 
making TCMetrics a very viable option for secure systems. 
Ill. SECURITY PRIMITIVES 
All security applications require proper generation and 
maintenance of keys during their lifecycle. The security of an 
application also depends on the strength of the cryptographic 
key. Tn the following section we briefly describe the various 
security primitives that we have employed in our proposed 
scheme for the generation of strong key pairs based on 
ICMetrics: 
A. Key Generation and Public Key Cryptography 
Key generation is one of the most sensitive cryptographic 
functions. Cryptographic keys that form a part of symmetric 
key schemes have a single secret key that is shared between 
communicating parties and is used for all encryption/ 
decryption operations. Cryptographic keys that form a part of 
asymmetric key schemes have two parts; a private key and a 
corresponding public key. A public key can be publically 
distributed whereas a private key has to be kept secret. The 
public key is used by other parties to send messages securely to 
the person that generated the key pair or to verify digital 
signatures generated by the person who generated the key pair. 
The private key is used to decrypt messages or to generate 
digital signatures[26]. 
B. Key Derivation Function 
Key Derivation Function (KDF) is a special transformation 
function that can bring a number in raw form to a form that can 
be securely used as a key for secure operations [16]. This 
transformation on the raw number will safeguard the key 
against brute force attacks and exhaustive search attacks. This 
special mechanism that transforms raw keys to secure 
cryptographic keys of a required length, and also generates 
keys having sufficient entropy and randomness is called a key 
derivation function [17]. This function is essential in all 
security applications and generates keys with high entropy that 
can be safely used in security critical applications. The key 
derivation function, takes the raw password and a random salt 
as input, and applies multiple iterations of a function H (such 
as hash or block cipher); to generate keys with high entropy. 
C. Key Stretching 
Key-stretching is a method to hinder an attacker's ability to 
reproduce a key derivation function [19]. Key stretching makes 
use of iterated hashing to generate keys of a particular length 
with high entropy. Key stretching strengthens the key against 
brute force attacks by increasing key length and entropy 
thereby making it unfeasible for the attacker to launch brute 
force attacks. 
Although key derivation functions and key stretching give a 
sense of similarity, since they are both based on hash 
generation functions to generate high entropy keys [18]. 
However their design principles are significantly different, 
since key stretching tends to derive long keys by concatenating 
the output of each hash function iteration while Key Derivation 
Functions (KDF) iteratively hash the same input key to 
produce high entropy key. 
D. SHA-2 
A hash function [20] is a deterministic function that takes 
an arbitrary length bit string as input and outputs a fixed 
length bit string called a hash value. The length of generated 
hash value depends on the employed hash function [21]. The 
well-known hash algorithms include MD 5, SHAl, SHA2 etc.; 
each having variants of differing hash value lengths for an 
input block [22][23][24]. 
SHA-2 [24] is a set collision resistant cryptographic hash 
functions proposed by the National Security Agency. It is the 
second in Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) series designed by 
the National Security Agency. SHA-2 is a stronger hash 
function from its predecessor SHA-1 [22]; and is the standard 
adopted in many security applications and protocols such as 
TLS, TPSec, etc. SHA-2 has four hash variants of varying 
sized digests, namely SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 and 
SHA-512. SHA-224 outputs a 224 bits digest, computing on 
block sizes of 512 bits in each of the 64 rounds of the hash 
computation operation. SHA-256 outputs a 256 bits digest, 
working with 512 bit blocks in each of the 64 rounds of hash 
computation operation. SHA-384 and SHA-512 both work 
with block sizes of 1024 bits in each of the 80 rounds while 
giving digest sizes of 3 84 bits and 512 bits respectively [24]. 
E. Hermite Normal Form 
Tn our research, the public key for the generated high 
entropy private key is generated based on Hermite Normal 
Form (HNF) of the high entropy private key. Every matrix has 
a unique corresponding Hermite Normal Form 'H' and can be 
bought into its corresponding Hermite Normal Form by a 
sequence of elementary column operations. A non-singular 
square matrix 'H' is said to be in Hermite Normal Form 
(HNF) if it has the following properties[6] [7]: 
1) hij = 0 for i < j (i.e., H is lower triangular); 
2) 0 <:: hij < hii for i>j (i.e., H is non-negative and each row 
has a unique maximum entry, which is on the main 
diagonal) 
TV. NETWORK TOPOLOGY 
Our proposed scheme is an idea for networked 
environments and all devices forming part of the network have 
trust in a trusted third party (TTP), as shown in Fig. 1. A 
trusted third party enables entities that never had contact 
before to interact securely and confidentially. We discuss our 
key generation scheme in terms of communication within a 
single cluster, although our scheme can be easily extended to 
multiple clusters connected together through multiple TTP's. 
Authentication between the trusted third party and the entities 
takes place based on traditional authentication protocols [25-
30] and is not the focus of this paper. The focus of this 
research is to propose a scheme for the generation of strong 
keys based on TCMetrics, so we haven't formally explained 
the process of authentication between the entities and the 
trusted third party, and therefore we simply assume that all 
communications take place authentically and confidentially. 
Figure 1. Network Topology for Proposed Architecture 
v. THE PROPOSED SECURITY FRAMEWORK 
In our design, we aim to improve the security of ICMetrics 
secret key by proposing a scheme that generates strong key 
pairs based on ICMetrics basis number. The proposed scheme 
is an idea for the generation of high entropy TCMetrics keys of 
sufficient length, which can be used for secure cryptographic 
operations in various applications. The following section 
details the six steps involved for the generation of strong 
public/private key pair based on TCMetrics extracted feature 
values: 
A. Key Setup 
The first phase of the proposed scheme requires each 
device that is part of the network to generate an TCMetrics 
basis number based on the extracted feature values. Tn [12], 
Papoutsis et al. propose two possibilities for combining the 
feature values of a device based on TCMetrics; concatenation 
of feature values or addition of feature values to generate a 
basis number, and hence serve as the secret key. The authors 
also show that a basis number generated as a result of 
concatenation of feature values although generates a long 
secret key but the secret key is not stable. On the other hand, 
while the basis number generated as a result of addition of 
feature values is short (35 bits) but is more stable. The ideal 
case would be to have a basis number that is stable as well as 
long, so that it qualifies for becoming a secret key during 
secure network operation. Tn our proposed scheme we take a 
stable but short basis number that was generated as a result of 
addition of feature values rather than concatenation, so each of 
the extracted feature values are added to generate a short but 
stable secret key/basis number. 
Therefore, the key setup algorithm generates the master 
private key for the trusted third party (TIP) and all other 
entities that form a part of the network. The ICMetrics 
generated basis number of the trusted entity serves as its 
master private key. 
Master Private Key of TTP 'MPr/ = Basis Number using 
TCMetrics of Device 
Similarly all entities with identities TD], TD2, . . .  , TD" also 
generate their its master private key's MPrl,MPr2, . . .  , MPr" 
respectively based on their ICMetrics basis number and hence 
use their master private key for further operations as shown in 
figure as shown in Fig. 2. 
Figure 2. Functional Diagram of Proposed Design 
B. Generation of High Entropy Private Key for TTP 
This algorithm is responsible for generation a of high 
entropy private key for the TTP. The first step of this 
algorithm involves the TTP computing its master public key 
'MPb/ based on its master private key 'MPr/ using the 
following 
Master Public Key of TTP 'MPbt'= Hermite-Normal-Form 
(Master Private Key of TTP 'MPr/) 
Then the TTP combines its master private key 'MPrt' and 
HNF(MPrt II MPbt) using SHA-2 to generate high entropy 
private key 'EPrt' for TTP that can be used for secure onward 
operation, as shown in Fig.3. Both 'MPrt' and HNF (MPrt II 
MPbt) are combined via a SHA-2 based key stretching and 
derivation algorithm. The purpose of the SHA-2 based key 
stretching algorithm is to combine and thus stretch the key, so 
that it qualifies for use in secure operations. We propose the 
use of SHA-2 for the purpose of key stretching which will 
bring an increase in the key length as well as increase the 
entropy of the key. 
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Figure 3. High Entropy Key Generation at TTP 
The proposed SHA-2 based key stretching algorithm takes 
the TCMetrics generated basis number as input and after 
performing multiple iterations of each round of SHA-2; it 
produces a longer stretched high entropy key as shown in 
Table 1. The value of number of iterations 'n' of SHA-2 has to 
be selected by setting a trade-off between security and 
efficiency; since greater number of iterations of the hash 
function will translate directly into an increase in entropy of 
the generated key. Therefore the value of n can be selected 
based on application requirements as shown below in table 1. 
Table 1. Proposed Key Derivation and Stretching Algo. for TTP Priv. Key 
Xo = SHA-2 (MPrb HNF (MPrt II MPbt)) 
For t = 1 to n 
Xi = SHA-2 (MPri, Xt-I) 
Xo = Xo II Xi 
High Entropy Private Key 'EPrt' = Xo 
Now the generated key 'Xo' is broken into required key 
length blocks; starting from the right and appending zeros to 
the left most block to make its size compatible with rest of the 
blocks. Then finally all the blocks are XORed to obtain the 
required sized key, which gives the fmal high entropy private 
key for the TTP. 
C. Generation of High Entropy Public Key for TTP 
This step involves the TTP computing its corresponding 
public key from the high entropy private key 'EPrt' using: 
Public Key of TTP 'EPb/= Hennite-Nonnal-Fonn(High 
Entropy Private Key of TTP 'MPrt') 
Finally the TTP has a high entropy public/private key pair 
generated that it can use for onward operations/ communication 
with other entities in the network. 
D. Generation of Partial Private Key 
This algorithm is run by the TTP in which it generates a 
partial key for each network entity based on entity's publically 
known identity information. We use the MAC address of each 
device as publically known identity information. 
1) Compute Qi = SHA-2 (LD;) 
2) Output partial private key 'PPi'=(EPrt)x(Qi) 
The generated partial private key 'PPi' generated by the 
TTP is sent to entity IDi. This process of supplying partial 
private keys takes place confidentially and authentically, the 
KGC ensures that the partial private keys are delivered 
securely to the correct entities. 
£. Generation of High Entropy Private Key at each Entity 
The user with identity IDi, combines both the TTP 
generated partial private key 'PP;' and its own master private 
key 'MPr;' to generate high entropy private key 'EPri' for TDi, 
for secure onward operations, as shown in Fig. 4. 
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Figure 4. High Entropy Key Generation at each Participating Entity 
Both PPi and MPri are combined via SHA-2, as shown in 
Table II. The purpose of the SHA-2 based key stretching and 
derivation algorithm is to combine and thus stretch the key, so 
that it qualifies for use in secure operations. We propose the 
use of SHA-2 for the purpose of key stretching and derivation 
since they will both bring an increase in the key length as well 
as increase the entropy of the key. The SHA-2 based key 
stretching and derivation algorithm takes the TCMetrics 
generated basis number as input and after performing multiple 
iterations of SHA-2 rounds, it produces a longer stretched high 
entropy key. 
Table II: Proposed Key Derivation and Stretching Algo. for Entity's Priv. Key 
Xo = SHA-2(MPri' PPi) 
For t = 1 to n 
Xi = SHA-2(MPri' Xt-I) 
Xo = Xo II Xi 
High Entropy Private Key 'EPr;' = Xo 
Now the generated key 'Xo' is broken into blocks of equal 
size according to the required key length; starting from the 
right and appending zeros to the left most block to make its 
size compatible with rest of the blocks. Then fmally all blocks 
are XORed to generate the required sized key, which gives the 
fmal high entropy private key for the entity LDi. Exclusive Ors 
add an extra layer of protection but the actual security lies in 
the iterations of the hashing function. 
F. Generation of High Entropy Public Key at each Entity 
Then it computes public key from the high entropy private 
key 'EPri' using the following: 
Public Key of IDi 'EPb;'= Hennite-Nonnal-Fonn(High 
Entropy Private Key of IDi 'EPrt') 
Finally the entity LDi now has a high entropy public/private 
key pair generated that it uses for secure onward operations/ 
communication with other entities in the network. 
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS 
In the proposed scheme we have combined the security 
advantages of ICMetrics secret key and security properties of 
SHA-2 for the generation of a strong private key. The security 
of our scheme is based on the mixing of a partial key from the 
TTP with the TCMetrics basis number, and rehashing it a 
number of times based on SHA-2, to produce a strong public/ 
private key pair. This feature ensures authenticity/ 
identification of participating entities and also assures the 
origin of information; since only entities that have been 
assigned a partial key from TTP can communicate with other 
entities in the network. To regenerate the publici private key 
pair, the generating entity must have the knowledge of both 
the user partial key and secret basis number. Knowing only 
one of them does not allow the generation of key pairs. This 
safeguards the network from attackers, SInce only 
authenticated entities that have been issued a partial secret by 
the TTP can form part of network. The SHA-2 based key 
stretching and derivation operation on the TCMetrics secret 
key, results in a longer and high entropy private key that helps 
safeguards against brute force/ exhaustive search attack. 
The second phase of our scheme, generates a 
corresponding strong public key by computing the HNF. The 
corresponding public key of a generated strong private key is 
generated by computing the HNF of the private key. The 
Hermite Normal Form of a number is unique and non­
reversible, therefore it proves to be a very good choice for the 
computation of the corresponding public key. Each 
participating entity's public key is made available to other 
entities by transmitting it along with messages or by placing it 
in a public directory. But no further security is applied to the 
protection of A's public key. This idea helps preserve the 
security properties of TCMetrics generated keys and at the 
same time generates high entropy key pairs for use in future 
operations. 
The proposed scheme also has its efficiency advantages, 
since the high entropy private key of an entity is computed 
every time a session starts and removed from memory once 
the session is over, whereas the public key is computed only 
once when an entity joins the network and stays with the 
participating nodes. This eliminates tremendous amounts of 
computation/ communication required for computing/ 
distributing the public keys whenever a new session starts. 
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
A framework for generation of strong high entropy keys of 
sufficient length for TCMetrics secret key is introduced in this 
paper. The proposed scheme effectively combines the 
functionalities of ICMetric keys coupled with authentication 
tokens from the trusted third party, thereby providing 
authentication and identification of the device. In this paper, 
we have designed a password-based key derivation function, 
in which we employ SHA-2 for stretching the ICMetrics key 
using partial key from the TTP, to generate a high entropy 
TCMetrics private key. The high entropy public key 
corresponding to the high entropy key is computed by 
calculating the Hermite Normal Form of the high entropy 
private key. The proposed scheme has been very carefully 
tuned with the underlying requirements of TCMetrics. By 
employing our key generation scheme we are able to prevent 
most of the depicted threats while considering the constraints 
that embedded systems demands. The design decisions of our 
architecture have a number of important consequences and 
make it particularly suitable for resource constrained 
environments, which require elimination of additional 
communication and resource intensive operations while 
providing the required security. 
Our future plan is to evaluate the scheme proposed here 
through experiments and analysis, thus benchmarking the 
results against existing key generation schemes in resource 
constrained environments. We are confident that our proposed 
architecture will be an efficient and viable solution for secure 
generation of strong high entropy key pairs. We also plan to 
design a protocol for secure communication based on the 
generated high entropy key pairs. 
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